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NOTE
"COPYRIGHT" PROTECTION FOR UNCOPYRIGHTABLES: THE COMMON-LAW DOCTRINES
I.

INTRODUCTION:

THE UNPROTECTED "AUTHOR"

The power of the federal government to provide a statutory scheme
for the vindication of a creator's right in literary and artistic works arises
from the eighth clause of article I, section 8 of the Constitution.' The
language of the grant enunciates a federal policy aimed at striking a balance
between the need to encourage creativity by grant of monopoly and the
ultimate interest of the public in unrestricted freedom to copy the works
of others after the authors have reaped their rewards. To accomplish these
ends, Congress was given the power to secure to "Authors" exclusive rights
in their "Writings" for limited times. By a series of acts which exercise
this broad grant of power only incompletely Congress has provided an effective scheme of protection to the authors of certain classes of published
works 2 and, in limited cases, unpublished works.3
It is beyond dispute that the benefits of copyright could constitutionally
be extended to many kinds of works not presently protected by federal
legislation. 4 In this area between the outer limits of the statute and the
constitutional clause, pressures have built up for the creation of some form
of protection. Frustrated in their attempts to secure amendment of the
statute,6 creators of works of this kind have ultimately, not unnaturally,
turned to the states, for the states have long been the primary source-of
protection for a vast array of what are frequently denominated "property"
rights. The fact that the property is literary or artistic does not of itself

1 "The Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
2 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
8

17 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).

4 E.g., the performer's interest in recorded musical composition, to which the
Copyright Office has refused protection. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (Supp. 1959), is
generally conceded to be constitutionally capable of federal protection. See, e.g.,
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 660, 664 (2d Cir.
1955). For an excellent treatment of the problems involved in protection for dress
designs see Elman, The Limits of State Jurisdiction in Affording Common Law
Protection to Clothing Designs, 11 VAN. L. REv. 501 (1958).
5 For a history of some of these attempts see Countryman, The Organized
Musicians, 16 U. CHL L. Rxv. 239, 259 (1949) ; Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. LJ.
235 (1944); U.S. Copyright Office, Limitations on Performing Rights (General
Revision of the Copyright Law Study No. 16, 1959); U.S. Copyright Office, The
Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings (General Revision of the Copyright
Law Study No. 5, 1958).
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bar them from according at least some protection. Where matter capable
of statutory copyright is involved, the federal statute by its express language contemplates state protection of the matter in its unpublished form.6
As to matter outside the class which the statute covers, it is wholly silent.
Legal recognition by the state courts of a protectible interest in original
intellectual expression has taken numerous forms; the artist and the performer have borrowed heavily from other areas of the law for the doctrinal
bases of their claims. Both by common law and to a lesser extent by statute, a highly elaborate network of rights has grown up at the fringes of,
and often overlapping, the federal statutory system. It is the purpose of
this Note to analyze that growth, to determine the extent to which, and the
ways in which, the states have in fact taken on the task of protecting the
copyright interest, and to treat the question of the propriety, in light of the
relevant considerations of power and policy, of the states engaging in that
task.
The cases which stand in sharpest relief in the evolution of the network
of state-created rights are characterized by an unusually high degree of
judicial erudition and resourcefulness. Two in particular are significant
for the wide range of theories which they collect and discuss: Waring v.
WDAS BroadcastingStation, Inc.7 and Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp.8 Taken together they afford a profusion of legal ideas, many
of which have emerged as recurring themes in the subsequent common-law
development.
The Waring case was decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in 1937. Waring had made recordings of several copyrighted songs for
Victor Records, who held a license from the copyright proprietor. In
selling the records to the public, Victor, pursuant to an agreement with
Waring, placed on each a label reading, "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast." Defendant disregarded this restriction, purchasing the records for
seventy-five cents a copy and broadcasting them without securing permission from either Waring or Victor, although it did obtain permission from
the copyright proprietor. In the course of the broadcasts defendant indicated that the performances were recorded and identified Waring as the
performing artist. Waring, who at the time of the unauthorized broadcasts
had been engaged to make weekly live radio appearances at $13,500 per
appearance, successfully sued to enjoin defendant's broadcasts.
Justice Stem, writing for the court, noted that the performance could
not have been copyrighted. 9 He recognized, however, the artist's need
to protect the return derived from his performances, particularly against
competitors. Since an artist such as Waring adds something unique to the
original composition, he reasoned, a common-law property right exists.10
6 See 17 U.S.C. §2 (1958).

7327 Pa. 433, 194 AtI. 631 (1937).
8229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
9 327 Pa. at 437, 194 Ati. at 633.
10 Id. at 441-42, 194 AtI. at 635.
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Reviewing a number of cases in which equitable servitudes had been denied
effect, Justice Stern concluded that they depended on a public policy against
restrictions of certain kinds on the use of chattels and found Waring distinguishable. Here home use was left unrestricted, and the restriction imposed-which had the legitimate purpose of permitting performers to make
recordings without subjecting themselves to loss from radio broadcasts 11-_
was found not unreasonable. Justice Stern also held that quite apart from
any other theory, plaintiff was entitled to relief under the doctrine of unfair
competition. 12 Although aware that that doctrine was normally applied
to bar one person from passing off his goods as those of another, he read
the case of InternationalNews Serv. v. Associated Press 13 as authority for
the proposition that the doctrine also applies to unfair appropriation. Here,
he said, defendant had appropriated plaintiff's "musical genius," using
it to compete against plaintiff in furnishing radio entertainment. And, as
in INS, Waring had dedicated his work only to home use, not to competitive use. 14 Justice Maxey, in a concurring opinion, disagreed. 15 He
saw in INS nothing more than protection against passing off. But he
found a theory of protection in the right of privacy possessed by all performers regardless of the artistic value of their interpretation-a right to
choose whether, when, how, and to whose advantage their renditions
should be reproduced.
Ettore was decided by the Third Circuit in 1956. Plaintiff was an
ex-boxer who had been knocked out by Joe Louis in a heavyweight match
twenty years earlier. He had sold his movie rights in the fight for $250,
and films had been made (whether or not copyrighted the opinion does not
indicate) and widely exhibited in motion picture houses. In 1949 and
1950, these films were telecast by defendant as part of a series entitled,
"Greatest Fights of the Century." Ettore complained that the telecasts
were made without his consent and that the films had been edited to exclude
his best round. An award of damages and injunctive relief was upheld
under the laws of the four states-New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and Delaware-reached by the telecasts.
Judge Biggs' majority opinion held that the Pennsylvania courts would
allow recovery under a theory of unfair competition. That doctrine had
been extended in Waring to embrace the misappropriation of a performer's
property in his performance. The fact that Ettore was not an artist in the
Waring sense was immaterial. The criterion for Judge Biggs was not
the performer's artistry, but whether or not he performed for pay.' 6 Nor
did the fact that Ettore had failed to reserve expressly the television rights
11 Id. at 447, 194 At. at 638.
12 Id. at 449, 194 Atl. at 638.
13248 U.S. 215 (1918). This landmark case is discussed in detail in text
accompanying notes 47-49, 61-64 infra.
14 327 Pa. at 453, 194 At. at 640.
15 Id. at 456, 194 At. at 642.
16 229 F.2d at 490.
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defeat his action; the fact that at the time of the fight commercial television
was relatively unknown was considered the legal equivalent of express
reservation. 17 Recovery under the law of New Jersey was based on the
right of privacy, which Judge Biggs found afforded protection to a property right in that state. 18 The privacy ground was foreclosed, however, in
New York, where prior interpretations of the statute creating that right
rendered it unavailable to plaintiff in the absence of proof that his name or
likeness was incorporated into the advertising accompanying the showing
of the films. 19 There, Judge Biggs decided, recovery would be allowed
under the doctrine of unfair competition as developed by the Metropolitan
Opera2 0 and CapitolRecords 21 cases. In Delaware Judge Biggs found no
cases in point, but concluded that the courts of that state would follow those
22
of New Jersey or Pennsylvania and allow recovery.
Judge Hastie entered a strong dissent. He agreed that plaintiff had
originally possessed a common-law copyright. That right, however, had
been divested by the publication of the original films. 23 Waring, he concluded, protected the performer only through a reservation of rights by
contract, which Ettore had failed to make. To Judge Hastie, the fact that
commercial television may have been unknown at the time of the fight
meant simply that plaintiff had dedicated to the public all which it was in
his competence to give.2 4 Moreover, he asserted, a federal court should
not attach an equitable servitude in the absence of a clear warrant in
25
state law.
Four distinct common-law theories of relief may be distinguished in
the opinions in these two cases: common-law copyright, unfair competition,
the right of privacy, equitable servitude. This is the basic catalogue of
rights from which claimants have drawn theoretical support in seeking
vindication under state law of a copyright interest in material constitutionally capable of copyright but not protected by federal legislation.
II.

THE CATALOGUE oF RIGHTS

A. Common-Law Copyright
The most ancient and perhaps the most basic form of literary protection existing beyond the statutory framework arises from the commonlaw doctrine of literary and artistic property: that is, common-law copyId. at 491.
18 Ibid.
17

19
2 See note 139 ira and accompanying text.
o Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S2d
795 2(1951).
See text accompanying notes 38-42 infra.
1
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
See text accompanying notes 44-45 infra.
22229 F2d at 492.
243 Id. at 497.
Id. at 498.
2
. 5 Ibid.
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right. Yet until a century and a quarter ago the nature of this right in the
United States was unclear. Donaldson v. Becket 2' had long established
the rule in England that an author's interest in his works did not end with
their publication. But in 1834, in the momentous case of Wheaton v.
Peters,27 the United States Supreme Court unequivocally cast the author's
interest in the form of a prepublication right, holding that the common-law
property of an author in his creation does not survive publication.
So vast and far-reaching are the consequences of this choice, that one
marvels at the absence in the opinion of any articulation of the considerations of doctrine or policy which must have motivated it. Justice McLean
confines himself to the assertion that, while the literary man is as much
entitled to the product of his labor as any other member of society, that
product is realized in the transfer of his manuscripts or in the sale of his
works when first published.28 The monopoly thus conferred was a conditional one-a right, not to exclude others from publishing one's work, but
rather only to prevent their anticipating one's own publication.
No distinction had to be drawn in Wheaton v. Peters between the
scope of subject matter of the right asserted at common law, and that of
the right available under the federal statute. The matter sought to be
protected consisted of twelve volumes of cases argued before and decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court opined that, as to
the written opinions of the Court, no reporter had or could have a copyright.29 But as to the other matter contained in the books, and perhaps as
to the arrangement, the implication was that the material which plaintiff
had sought to protect under a common-law copyright could have been
protected by the statute.
The question of whether a common-law copyright could arise in matter
not capable of statutory copyright was decided in the affirmative by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Waring. But Waring, which found a
common-law property in the performer's artistic interpretation of musical
works, necessarily left open the issue whether there must be such an
artistic or literary element in the work for it to be protectible by commonlaw copyright. When this further question was reached in Ettore, the
Third Circuit dealt with the matter by declining to involve itself in a
weighing of the relative merits of Waring's and Ettore's performances; it
arrived at the proposition that a performance, conceivably any performance,
vests in the performer a common-law property interest in the product of
his efforts.30
26 4 Burr. 2408, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).

U.S. (8 Pet.) 374 (1834).
8 Id. at 418.
29 Id. at 425.
30 229 F.2d at 490. The Ettore decision raises serious questions as to the ultimate
scope of the common-law property right. The protection which the Constitution
authorizes Congress to extend-presumably the product of the drafters' reconciliation
of the public and private literary interests-is limited to those circumstances in which
are comprised at least the two component fact constellations symbolized by the terms
'Writings" and "Authors." Arguably, Ettore's recorded performances might fall
2733

2
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This extension of common-law copyright beyond the area susceptible
of statutory protection has profound implications for the nature of the right
itself. Where statutory copyright is available, a prepublication right is
adequate for a creator's needs, since if he wishes to disseminate and profit
from his work, he can secure a federal monopoly merely by complying with
the statute. But as the right is stretched beyond this area, enormous pressures are put on the courts to relax the doctrine of publication, so as to
permit the monopoly to be retained while the author enjoys a certain
amount of dissemination. The tendency of these forces is to turn the common-law right into a substitute for the statutory right, warping commonlaw copyright by pushing back the point of publication.
In fact, the few cases which have dealt with the problem clearly suggest that the degree of dissemination of a work which will be held consistent with retention of the common-law prepublication right will depend
upon whether or not the element which is sought to be protected is capable
of protection under the copyright laws. Where the possibility of federal
copyright exists, the tendency has been to force creators to seek statutory
protection at an early stage, by withdrawing the common-law protection
at the point where financial rewards are to be reaped. Thus, in Shapiro,
within the concept of a "Writing." But suppose a state court sought to create an
artistic property right in something that could not be found to be a "Writing" in the
constitutional sense-a spontaneous oral address, perhaps, or an improvised dance
routine? Would a federal inhibition be spun from the language of the copyright
clause? Aspects of this problem are treated at length in the excellent article,
Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection of Literary
and Artistic Property, 72 HARv. L. Rxv. 1079 (1959).
The other potentially limiting dimension-the constitutional "Author"--can perhaps best be demonstrated by carrying Ettore's extension of Waring to the extreme
fact situation of Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951), a privacy
case. There plaintiff's photograph, taken while plaintiff lay in the street after an
automobile accident and published shortly thereafter in the daily press, was subsequently acquired by defendant through an agency and printed in defendant's magazine
in connection with an article on pedestrian carelessness. Had plaintiff sought commonlaw copyright protection, the same court which had refused to make an aesthetic
discrimination between Waring's and Ettore's performances (and which, presumably,
would similarly refuse to distinguish between the filmed performance of a dramatic
screen actress and that of a walk-on actress who lends little to the picture but her
appearance--or between the latter case and that of a model for a still photograph)
might nevertheless refuse to extend relief on the Leverton facts, where plaintiff's
contribution was wholly nonvolitional. In this instance, there would seem to be no
constitutional bar to affording recovery, since the states, copyright aside, could invoke
other grounds for the creation of a right of personality in plaintiff's photograph
-e.g., the privacy theory under which Leverton was actually litigated. But what
the constitutional copyright clause may not proscribe as a limit of power it may
nevertheless persuasively recommend as a norm of value for the exercise of power.
Had Miss Leverton failed to bring her case within the right-of-privacy syntax (had
the Curtis article stressed driver negligence, not pedestrian negligence, for example),
a state court might well refuse common-law copyright protection on reasoning which
parallels and draws upon the "Author" limitation in the constitutional grant. Cf.
Brandeis, J., dissenting in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 254 (1918) : "At common law, as under the copyright acts, intellectual productions
are entitled to such protection only if there is underneath something evincing the
mind of a creator or originator, however modest the requirement. The mere record
of isolated happenings, whether in words or by photographs not involving artistic
skill, are denied such protection." But see Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
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Bernstein,31 the production and sale of phonograph records was held to
divest a common-law right in the copyrightable element in musical com-2
positions. And although it was early established in Ferris v. Frohman3
that a mere public performance for profit not involving any transcription in
tangible form would not constitute a divestitive publication, at least one
court has suggested that where statutory protection is available, "'publication' should be construed to be the same as 'make public.' "33
However where innovators have recourse solely to the common law,
the trend has been strongly in the opposite direction. Not only has protection been consistently accorded to creators of performances not committed to any permanent form, but it has been extended in a number of
cases to interests in performances embodied in films and records. The
Waring case falls in this latter class. Concededly, it is difficult to tell to
what extent its result is controlled by the presence of the restrictive notice
on the record label, and courts unfriendly to the extreme position have
construed the decision as governed by the servitude.3 4 But Justice Stern's
reliance on the proposition that publication is a matter of intent is wholly
consistent with the view that the production and sale of records does not
dedicate. Indeed it is not at all clear whether he treats the restrictive notice
on the label as the source of an equitable servitude moving with the chattel
or merely as persuasive evidence of an intent not to cast the performer's
interest into the public domain.
Three years after Waring a case involving a virtually indistinguishable
fact situation reached the Second Circuit. The importance to the legal
5
analyst of Judge Learned Hand's opinion in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman 3
lies less in its repudiation of the Waring result than in its articulation of
a clear principle which has been consistently applied by its author over the
ensuing two decades. Whiteman may be described as an attempt to freeze
31 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill.
1950) (action to enforce common-law copyright on sheet music). The holding on
publication is alternative; the court also expresses doubts about the copyrightability
of the particular piece of music involved.
32 223 U.S. 424 (1912) (public performance for profit of an unprinted play does
not divest the author's common-law copyright).
33 Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137, 139 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949).
The court found
dedication on evidence that Blanc had disseminated his Woody Woodpecker musical
laugh by both (1) original radio broadcasts, and (2) incorporation in the sound
tracks of animated cartoons. But the language of the opinion suggests that the court
might have found publication on the basis of the broadcasts alone, and the court goes
on, id. at 142, to provide this interesting insight into its reasoning: "Here then we
are confronted with a situation where, for the purposes of this motion, the plaintiff
had created a musical composition which he could have copyrighted under federal
law and thereby have secured a limited monopoly to the exclusive performance of
his intellectual product. By failure so to protect his work, yet by electing to exploit
it commercially not only by personal performance but also by reproducing his work
in a tangible form permitting general circulation of that composition by way of
copies, I conclude that plaintiff has lost his right to the exclusive property in the
laugh."
34Id. at 142; RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 712 (1940).

85 Ibid.
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the common-law right in uncopyrightables at the point set by Shapiro,
Bernstein for the law of copyrightables. At the heart of Judge Hand's
opinion is the distinction between the production-and-sale of phonograph
records and live performance no matter how extensive.3 6 The discrimination cuts at the point of embodiment of the performance in permanent form;
it has then become a "Writing," constitutionally capable of copyright.
Inasmuch as the performer can look to Congress for protection, Judge
Hand would hold that he must do so, and no restriction on a "Writing"
once made public, whether the restriction be regarded as evidence of intent
or as an attempt to impose a servitude, can prevent dedication. The fundamental assumption made is that, since the Constitution empowers federal
legislation to protect a performer's interest in a phonograph record, congressional inaction should operate as a command that there be no protection in either state or federal law. But where there is no recording, no
"Writing," in accord with the rule of Ferris the performer may appropriately seek redress at common law.
Judge Hand's attempt to fix the law at this point does not seem to have
succeeded. Subsequent opinions expressly acknowledge the tremendous
pressures exerted by creators who have been denied a statutory channel
of protection. Ettore, admittedly, was not a phonograph record case,
nor, by the articulated theory of the majority opinion, a common-law copyright case. But it did conclude that a plaintiff who voluntarily has his
performance committed by mechanical means to some permanent form does
not thereby surrender all legal control over its subsequent commercial
exploitation, even though no notice of restriction is placed upon the authorized reproduction.37 Indeed, the facts of Ettore suggest that the very
intent to restrict may be constructed post hoc; so appealing is the former
prizefighter's claim that the court sees fit to make their intent serve for his.
The more immediate successors of Whiteman illustrate a similar judicial tendency to relax the publication rules in favor of performer plaintiffs.
In 1950, the Metropolitan Opera Association, together with the assignees
of its radio and recording rights, successfully prosecuted suit in a New
York state court to restrain defendant from making and selling recordings
of its performances taken off the air.38 Stated thus, the case appears to be
governed by Judge Hand's own Whiteman dictum, advanced as explicative
of his permanent-form versus no-permanent-form distinction, that "if a
conductor played over the radio, and if his performance was not an abandonment of his rights, it would be unlawful without his consent to record it
as it was received from a receiving set and to use the record." 39 In his
86Id. at 88.
229 F.2d at 490-91.
8 Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,

37
3

101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd per curiant, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d
795 (1951).
39 114 F.2d at 88.
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later opinion in G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler,40 Judge Hand describes
Metropolitan Opera as a case in which the performance had not been
"published in the sense that publication is a dedication," leaving unclear
whether he considers the case within the logic of Whiteman or outside but
independent of it. Given the former interpretation, the statement in Ricordi
is clearly wrong. As Judge Dimock points out in the majority opinion
in Capitol Records,41 two of the operas sold by defendant in Metropolitan
Opera had been recorded by the Met for Columbia and sold by Columbia
with the Met's consent. By enjoining the further sale of defendant's recordings of these two operas, the New York court in Metropolitan Opera
impliedly repudiated the doctrine that production and sale of phonograph
42
records dedicates the performance.
The implications of this state decision for the Second Circuit were
clear. Erie43 had been handed down just two years before Whiteman.
If Judge Hand's decision in the latter case stood upon grounds of lesser
dimension than federal pre-emption, Whiteman was now no more the
law of the Second Circuit than it had previously been the law of New York.
The test came in the famous Capitol Records case. 44 One of two competing
record companies asserted a common-law performer's interest in recordings
of musical compositions in the public domain. Defendant had pressed
records from matrices held on license from plaintiff's grantor, the license
limiting their use to Czechoslovakia. Defendant then sold the records in
the United States in competition with plaintiff, who was the exclusive
licensee for this country. Plaintiff instituted a diversity action in the
southern district of New York, and on appeal confronted the Second Circuit
with New York's authoritative determination that production and sale of
phonograph records do not dedicate. Judges Dimock and Medina considered themselves bound by this interpretation of state law, and affirmed
judgment for the plaintiff. Judge Hand's dissent is probably most noted
for its proposed solution to the dilemma created by Erie: making "publication" a federal question. In this context, however, his attempt to limit
the operation of Metropolitan Opera is of at least equal significance. As
40 194
41221
42

F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir. 1952).
F.2d at 663.
In fairness to Judge Hand it must be conceded that the logic of the separate
performance theory raises a distinction between what may be viewed as the Met's
treatment of a particular opera and the Met's version of a particular opera as it
comes to the ear of a listener on a given Saturday afternoon. The pertinent question
here is: to which of these did the Met's consent run? Having consented to the
publication of the former by permitting Columbia to record at a special session, the
Met might still desire the latter version to remain unpublished because of unique
defects in that particular staging. This is in fact one of the theories on which relief
was sought. Yet it is plain that the primary hurt was not to plaintiff's reputation
but rather to its beneficial contractual relationship with Columbia Records, with
whom defendant had entered into competition. Paradoxically, the injury arose because
defendant's records were good enough to compete with the authorized transcription.
This being so, it is hard to reason that the publication by Columbia of its version
did not constitute a publication in general of repetitions of competitive quality.
43 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
44 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
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to matter not capable of copyright under the federal statute, he admitted, the
law of New York is that the common-law property is not lost by public sale
of the records; but if in Metropolitan Opera "the records had been copyrightable under the Act, there could be no doubt that publication would
have been a dedication of any common-law right." 45 This is, in fact, nothing more than the rule of Shapiro, Bernstein. Pressures for protection in
the field of uncopyrightables had proved too strong for it and it had given
way. But where copyrightable matter was concerned, its integrity was
unimpaired.
In the face of the same pressures, courts have sometimes been hard put
to explain why acts sufficient to dedicate, under traditional doctrines of
publication, do not do so in particular cases. The dissent in Wheaton v.
Peters had argued, against the majority's contention that publication is an
abandonment, that the question of abandonment should turn on the author's
intent. 46 Thus if the author, in publishing the book in the usual way, does
not intend to cast it into the public domain, it is not dedicated. New life
was infused into this discarded doctrine in the landmark case of International News Serv. v. Associated Press.47 There defendant had ap8
propriated the uncopyrightable news element of plaintiff's news stories 4
from newspapers sold and distributed on the East Coast with plaintiff's
consent, and from postings on public bulletin boards also made with plaintiff's consent. Defendant, a competitor with plaintiff in the distribution of
press dispatches to newspapers, had conveyed the news to its own West
Coast customers in time to permit them to publish the news at least as
promptly as plaintiff's West Coast customers. Relief was granted enjoining defendant's use of the news until its commercial value had passed
away. In a fashion destined to become characteristic of this kind of case,
the Supreme Court's majority opinion collects and intertwines a number
of theories, among them unfair competition and common-law copyright,
without settling on any definitive ground of decision. Putting aside the
unfair competition question, it is apparent that Mr. Justice Brandeis, in
dissent, is right that:
"If news be treated as possessing the characteristics not of a trade
secret, but of literary property, then the earliest issue of a paper of
general circulation or the earliest public posting of a bulletin which
embodies such news would, under the established rules governing
literary property, operate as a publication, and all property in the
49
news would then cease."
45

Id. at 666.

46 33

U.S. (8 Pet.) at 676.

47248 U.S. 215 (1918).
48 In some cases the words themselves, presumably copyrightable, had also been

taken. Id. at 232.

49 Id. at 256. Justice Brandeis asserts that the "general rule of law is, that the
noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideasbecome, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use."
Id. at 250. See also the dissent of Hastie, J. in Ettore, 229 F.2d at 496.
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The doubts which this passage conveys are met by the majority with the
unsupported assertion, echoing the Wheaton dissent, that "abandonment
is a question of intent" 50 and that, on the facts of the case, plaintiff could
not be said to have intended to yield up his right to prevent unrestricted
copying.
In Waring, where the intent is made express in the restrictive notice
printed on the record label, and in Ettore and Metropolitan Opera, where
it has to be inferred, this proposition, drawn from INS, is instrumental
in avoiding the divestitive effect of the creator's consent to dissemination
of his performance. In Whiteman, however, the counterpart of Waring,,
Judge Hand returns to the reasoning of Brandeis' INS dissent and, after
citing cases with which it is in accord, offers this articulation of the logic
behind it:
"It is quite true that if 'publication' were merely a question of intent,
these decisions are wrong, for the intent is obvious not to dedicate
the whole right. The problem is not so simple; in dealing with a
monopoly the law imposes its own limits." 51
The conflict over the place of intent in publication very neatly poses the
issue of the ultimate limits of common-law copyright. Basically the question is one of the amount of dissemination which is compatible with the
maintenance of this nonstatutory legal monopoly.
Could the states dispense entirely with the doctrine of publication?
It seems clear that if all that stood to obstruct them were the case of
Wheaton v. Peters, they could. Wheaton rests not upon any notion of a
federal common law of literary property but upon a conclusion drawn from
the common law of Pennsylvania. 52 The doctrine that the common-law
property of an author in his creation does not survive publication never
was the supreme law of the land. Putting aside for the moment the questions of federal pre-emption raised by Judge Hand in the Capitol Records
dissent, 53 the common-law literary property right emerges as a creature of
state law, cast in whatever form the state in its wisdom may choose. The
choice to adapt the common-law copyright into a substitute for federal
statutory protection does, however, raise grave policy questions. These
questions are better discussed after all the data has been martialed for
examination, and they have been reserved for a later section.
B. Unfair Competition
The taproot of unfair competition has been said to lie in the field of
trademarks and trade names. 54 Shortly before the turn of the century, a
U.S. at 240.
F.2d at 89.
U.S. at 419-21.
text accompanying note 165 infra.
542 KAPLAN & BROWN, COPYRIGHT AND UNFAIR
50 248
51114
52 248
53 See

COMPETITION

479 (1958).
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writer in the Harvard Law Review 55 sought to demonstrate the similarity
between the law of trademarks, which by 1890 was quite highly developed
and generally understood, and the law running through a number of
uncollated cases having to do with various kinds of shabby business practices. As most closely related to trademark law he referred to those cases
in which defendant seeks to pass off his goods as those of plaintitio by
disguising them in some way short of copying plaintiff's mark. The heart
of the latter's claim lies not in a permanent exclusive right to the particular mark, but rather in a petition to equity for relief from defendant's
fraudulent interference with plaintiff's profitable business relationships.
The case of the rival schoolmaster who lies in wait to frighten away the
students of his competitor, 56 and the miscreant who maliciously drives the
ducks from his neighbor's pond 57 were thus brought within a single
harmonizing principle equally evident in trademark law.
The essence of trademark protection is monopoly.58 It consists of the
power to prevent others from using a mark or name which one has adopted.
Unlike the monopolies of patents and copyrights, its origins are in the
common law, and the common law has traditionally demanded that a grant
of monopoly be justified by some interest sufficient to override the fundamental assumptions of competition. 59
The appropriation of another's label or mark may work two kinds of
injury: it may harm the consumer, and it also may harm the owner of the
mark. If the consumer is deceived as to the origin of the good, he is injured
by being kept from exercising a rational judgment in making a purchase.
Arguably, this works no harm to him if he suffers no pecuniary loss and if
the misbranded goods are in no way inferior.60 But in every case, the
mark-owner is harmed, for if the goods are inferior his reputation will
suffer, and even if they are not he has lost to a competitor a part of the
market which he had created for his product by getting the public to associate that mark with his particular good.
When one moves beyond trademark law, other possibilities appear.
A competitor may appropriate the thing itself, and sell it as his own. This
is essentially the situation raised by the facts of INS. The element of
deception is still present, but some of the other elements of the classic
"passing-off" case have been altered. In the normal pattern, defendant
55 Cushing, Ont Certain Cases Analogous to Trademarks, 4 HARV. L. Rxv. 321
(1891). Concerning the significance of Cushing's role, see Chafee, Unfair Competition,
53 HAR v. L. REv. 1289, 1297 (1940).
56
Y.B. Anon. 2 Henry 4, f. 47, pl. 21 (1410).
57 Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1809).
58 2 KAPLAN & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 54, at 472.
59
Ibid. See also Judge Frank's opinion in Briddell v. Alglobe Trading Corp.,
194 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1952).
60 It might on the other hand be argued that the inability to choose rationally is
itself a harm irrespective of whether financial loss results, or that, in any case, the
decision as to the value of nondeception is properly made by the consumer, not by
the courts.
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appropriates only plaintiff's good will, but not plaintiff's goods. In INS
the situation is precisely the reverse; defendant disdains plaintiff's good will,
but covets his work product. This difference has two important consequences: (1) since what is taken is not an imitation of plaintiff's product
or performance, but the thing itself, the dangers which arise from the
circulation of an inferior imitation do not arise; 61 and (2) since defendant
makes no use of plaintiff's name, the arguments based on the evils commonly incident to confusion of source and trading on another's reputation
are likewise out of place. This leaves very little of the classic unfair competition rationale intact; basically recovery seems to rest on something
akin to unjust enrichment. The court suggests this in INS: "[T]hese
elements [of false pretense], although accentuating the wrong, are not the
essence of it. It is something more than the advantage of celebrity of which
complainant is being deprived." 62 Back of this lies the assumption that
value is property; in other words, that because a thing has a pecuniary
worth, the law will protect the holder in the exclusive enjoyment of it.
Both Holmes, in concurrence, and Brandeis, in dissent, demonstrate the
incompatibility of this proposition with the common law's traditional bias
in favor of competition. 3 Both insist that the common law recognizes
monopoly only when it rests upon some overriding social policy. In INS,
Holmes is able to find this counterweight in the requirement that merchants
make frank disclosure of the source of the goods which they offer to the
public.6 4 Deception, albeit of a less damaging kind than that normally
encountered, is still sufficient warrant for judicial intervention into business
activities.
This element is not present in the case in which the competitor appropriates the thing itself and markets it making a correct and explicit attribution of its source. Since deception is absent here, presumably relief would
be insupportable under Holmes' logic in INS. Yet relief was granted on
fact situations akin to this in Waring and Metropolitan Opera. Still, all
of these cases share the common fact of competition, and to this extent they
draw strength from the classic theories of trademark law. One step beyond,
at the extremity of the spectrum, lies a still more tenuous case: that in
which the doctrine of unfair competition is made to support relief where
there is neither deception nor competition. This, it is submitted, is Ettore.
Ettore and its fellows pose frontally the question of the logic and
limits of unfair competition. The rationale of protecting the consumer
stops short of the case where deception is to the consumer's benefit, and
if it were only the consumer, not the competitor, about whom the law was
61 In INS, some of the news taken from plaintiff was rewritten by defendant's
employees. 248 U.S. at 231. As to this portion, arguably inferiority may be present.

In the absence of attribution of source, however, the argument of inferiority of course
becomes meaningless.
62 248 U.S. at 242.

63 Id. at 246, 250.
64
Id. at 247.
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concerned, perhaps it would be appropriate in all unfair competition cases
to require plaintiff to prove not only that the consumer was deceived but
that he was deceived to his detriment. 65 The competitor's suit would be
in the nature of a representative action brought in the interest of the
consumer.
But it is clear that the law goes further than this in protecting the competitor in his own interest, 66 and that it has extended a cause of action at
least to all cases in which the consumer is deceived. The question is, how
far beyond this will and should the courts be willing to go? Independent
grounds exist for recovery where there has been "dirty business" in the
traditional sense: bribing servants to reveal trade secrets,6 7 breaching
trust, and the like. 8 Should the law of unfair competition expand to give
relief in the case in which defendant has merely misappropriated plaintiff's
"property" ?
Certainly there has been a good deal of judicial talk of this kind. The
majority in INS made some effort to rest the judgment on a theory of
unjust enrichment. 69 Waring, although it is founded upon the assumption,
fundamental in INS, of value ergo property, tends to limit the principle
somewhat. In the first place, it expressly acknowledges the importance to
plaintiff's case of the element of competition, emphasizing that "it naturally
has become important for the artist . . . to protect his artistic product
against its indiscriminate reproduction . . . especially by . . . competitors." 70 But this statement also suggests a second requirement. The
nature of the injury in INS constituted a pre-emption of the market. 71 But
65 But see note 60 supra.
66
As early as 1900 the Sixth Circuit declared that: "The private action is given,
not for the benefit of the public, although this may be its incidental effect, but because
of the invasion by defendant of that which is the exclusive property of complainant'
American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281, 284 (6th Cir. 1900).
67 Injunctive relief was granted against this practice in the lower court in INS.
245 Fed. 244 (2d Cir.), modifying 240 Fed. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). The issue was not
dealt with by the Supreme Court.
68 See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905) ; Dior
v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nere., 2 App. Div. 878,
156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956).
69 See text accompanying note 62 supra. Cf., Restatement, Restitution § 136:
"A person who has tortiously used a trade name, trade secret, franchise, profit a
prendre, or other similar interest of another, is under a duty of restitution for the
value of the benefit thereby received." (1936).
Compare §§ 128 (tortious use of
chattels) and 134 (services tortiously obtained). Restitution theories have occasionally been used to protect the interest of a creator. E.g., Matarese v. MooreMcCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946) (cargo-loading device originated
by employee of defendant).
70 327 Pa. at 439, 194 Ati. at 634.
71248 U.S. at 239. Consider the difference in analysis suggested by a comparison
of localities served by both parties with those served by defendant alone. In the
latter class, the public benefits from the piracy, while plaintiff loses only if it is
assumed that the news-gatherer has a right to the income derived from the sale of
its news. In INS this discrimination is ignored, although it seems probable that
defendant distributed to both types of locality. Perhaps in light of the extent of
defendant's distribution system, such a distinction would be impracticable.
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by "indiscriminate reproduction" defendant can in addition, in some instances, work a permanent injury to the market. This would be the case
where part of the value of the good lies in its novelty or exclusivity. 72 As
contrasted with stealing the market, this type of injury might be characterized as spoiling the market. Justice Stern's opinion indicates that this
additional element, not present in INS, may be part of the basis for recovery in Waring 7 3 -which would constitute the latter, in this respect, the
somewhat narrower holding.
The "spoiling the market" injury is discernible in a number of decisions which purport to rest on broader grounds. In Fisher v. Star Co., 74
defendant's employees produced imitations of plaintiff's Mutt and Jeff
comic strips without his consent. The court granted injunctive relief,
reasoning that if defendant is free to imitate plaintiff's work, "it may result
in the public tiring of the 'Mutt and Jeff' cartoons." 75 Similarly, in
Metropolitan Opera, the court expressed the fear that if defendant were
left free to produce unlimited quantities of records, he might "seriously
damage or glut the market for its [the Association's] works." 76 While
in both these cases the menace to plaintiff's market arises in part from the
assumed inferiority of defendant's product, the courts are also obviously
77
concerned about the volume of distribution.
That the variety of ways in which a market can be spoiled is not limited
to cases of glut is well illustrated by the Lone Ranger case. 78 Plaintiff, the
creator of the Lone Ranger radio series, sued to enjoin defendant from
appearing in a circus as the Lone Ranger. Plaintiff successfully argued
that by materializing the figure of the Lone Ranger in the flesh, defendant
destroyed part of the mysterious appeal of plaintiff's radio character. 79 In
such a case, "indiscriminate reproduction," in the Waring sense, would
mean one copy.
But neither the stealing nor the spoiling rationale, even if each be
regarded as capable of supporting relief independently of the applicability
of the other, can be called upon to explain Ettore, a case that on its facts
goes well beyond the Waring holding on which it purports to rest. Neither
Ettore nor Waring contains that element of deception from which an injury
to the public might result; in both, in fact, the public may draw benefits
from defendant's acts in broadcasting plaintiff's performance at a reduced
cost. Neither decision appears to turn on the potential damage to reputa72

See cases cited note 81 infra.

See 327 Pa. at 439, 194 Atl. at 634.
74 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921).
75 Id. at 433.
73

76

199 Misc. at 804, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 500.

77

See Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 455, 194 At.

631, 641 (1937).
78
Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1942).
79
Deceptive advertising was also involved.
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tion which may arise from the circulation of an inferior imitation.80

In

both cases defendant has cashed in on plaintiff's performance for his own
economic benefit. But what distinguishes Ettore is the absence of a market
in which plaintiff and defendant compete, and of which plaintiff's share
may be spoiled by defendant's acts. 81 Perhaps if Ettore had still been
active as a boxer he might have had some interest in preventing the indiscriminate exhibition of his old films. But on the facts, unfair competition is hard to justify on anything other than a mere misappropriation

theory.
This progress from trademark to product misappropriation bears comparison with the course of evolution in New York. That state, of course,
has long accorded protection against passing-off.82 And it has done so in
the absence of competition. 3 The impact of the INS decision on the law
in New York seems to have been peculiarly uneven. judge Hand's position, in the Cheney8 4 and Whiteman cases, was that the doctrine of INS
was to be restricted to its immediate facts. Echoes of Brandeis' dissent
ring in Judge Frank's statement in Briddell v. Alglobe Trading Corp.: 85
"[T]he common law favors competition; and it is of the essence of
competition that competitors copy and undersell the product of an
originator. The competitors do not lose their favored common-law
position merely because someone chooses to call them 'free riders.'"
80 Something akin to this does arise in the facts of Waring. justice Stern comments that "the records being, as it happened in this case, old ones, the public were
led to judge the ability of the orchestra by work rendered at a time when it probably
had not attained its present high degree of excellence." 327 Pa. at 455, 194 At. at
641. There is no suggestion in the opinion, however, that the danger of injury from
this source was appreciable, and it does not figure in the controlling rationale. Nor
does Ettore's complaint that his best round had been excised from the fight films
appear to have determined the result in the later case.
81 The Third Circuit is by no means the first court to apply the doctrine of unfair
competition in a situation where competition is extremely limited (Ury v. Mazer
Cigar Mfg. Co., 253 Fed. 551 (8th Cir. 1918)) or even nonexistent. In Emerson
Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 616 (1939), defendant's goods in no way competed with plaintiff's.
In granting relief, Judge Hand explained the basis of protection thus: "[There are]
two supposititious interests which the putative wrongdoer invades. One of these is,
not in any sales of which he will deprive the plaintiff at the time, for the plaintiff is
not selling any of the wares in question, but in those sales which the plaintiff will lose
in case he chooses to extend his business into the market which the wrongdoer has

begun to exploit . . . . The other interest is the plaintiff's general reputation which
goes with his name . . . . [Ilf one merchant has established a business under his

name in wares of one sort, a second merchant may not use that name in other wares,
if these are so like the first merchant's that the public will be apt to think that the
first merchant is selling them." Id. at 909-10. It is important to note that unlike the
situation in Ettore the wrong that Judge Hand finds present in Emerson is that of
passing-off.
82 One of the earliest cases in that state was Howard v. Henriques, 3 Sandf. 725
(N.Y. Super. Ct. 1851).
83 Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., Inc., 188 N.E. 30, 262 N.Y. 482 (1933).
The Tiffany case has been viewed as settling all doubts on the question of the competition requirement in New York. See Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant &
Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc. 551, 556, 288 N.Y. Supp. 529, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
84 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930) (style pirating).
85 194 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir. 1952).
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The possible limits of this position, however, are suggested by the Mastercrafters case,8 6 decided by Judge Frank three years later. In Briddell,
Frank held that plaintiff had failed to establish a "secondary meaning" in
the design of his steak knives. Mastercrafterswas an action for declaratory
judgment against the manufacturer of a luxury clock which was operated
by atmospheric pressure and consequently had no cord. Plaintiff sold a
cheap imitation of defendant's clock, with an electric rather than an
atmospheric mechanism. Judge Frank reasoned that although, because
of the difference in price and the presence of the cord, plaintiff's customers
would know which clock they were buying, they might well be motivated
by a desire to deceive guests and visitors in their homes. Plaintiff's intent
to poach on defendant's reputation was held to give rise to a presumption
of confusion, shifting to plaintiff the burden of proving the absence of such
likelihood.
The majority rule in INS seems to have received far more hospitable
treatment at the hands of the state courts in New York. Judge Greenberg
in Metropolitan Opera,8s flatly asserting that INS has "extended the doctrine of unfair competition to cases based on misappropriation of property," 8 maintains that although originally a cause of action in unfair
competition required proof of both fraud on the public and misappropriation, the present law of New York requires only the latter. Yet it is not
entirely clear to what extent the doctrine of the INS majority had been
received into the law of New York before Metropolitan Opera, if in truth
that case can be said to have done just this. Most of the cases relied upon
by Judge Greenberg seem to have involved situations susceptible of analysis
in terms of the misrepresentation theory-failure to make proper attribution
of source-articulated in the Holmes concurrence in INS. Madison Square
Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Corp.,8 9 a case which involved newsreels of the New York Rangers hockey team in an arena misrepresented as
Madison Square Garden, contains the statement: "There may be unfair
competition by misappropriation as well as by misrepresentation. Both
elements are here." 90 Fisher v. Star 91 is certainly inapposite, since it involved an inferior-imitation element which also might have been decisive
under Holmes' formulation. Only the series of "sporting event" cases, of
which Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp.92 is representative, seems to offer support for the pure misappropriation theory. In
8
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-LeCoultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955).
87 199 Misc. at 795, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
88 Compare Justice Hughes' analysis in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 531 (1935).
89 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1938), motion for leave to appeal denied,
256 App. Div. 807, 9 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1939).
90255 App. Div. at 467, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53.
91231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921). See text accompanying notes 74, 75 supra.

92177

Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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Muzak, defendant picked up Mutual's radio broadcast of the World Series
and transmitted it to subscribers with full attribution of the correct source.
Had the Muzak line stood alone, Metropolitan Opera might be defensible as a logical extension of the prior New York law of unfair competition. But since 1932 there had been on the books a Court of Appeals
decision squarely rejecting an unfair competition claim founded in misappropriation. In Gotham Music,93 plaintiff had published a song in the
public domain under a title created by him. Defendant then published the
same song, using plaintiff's title. Judge Pound refused to enjoin defendant
from using the title, holding that in the absence of confusion, no relief could
be had. He reasoned that defendant was offering for sale no more nor
less than what he purported to sell, and that plaintiff had no rights to the
exclusive use of the title merely because he had invented it.94 There is no
indication in Judge Greenberg's opinion in Metropolitan Opera that this
decision was brought to the attention of the court. Had it been cited by
counsel, it is hard to see how the reasoning of his opinion could have taken
the form it did.9 5
The case of Dior v. Milton,96 decided by Judge Greenberg some six
years after Metropolitan Opera purports to build upon this decision and
to reaffirm the proposition that recovery under unfair competition may be
had in New York for mere misappropriation 7 In Dior, plaintiff sought
an injunction against the pirating of his dress styles by defendant. He
alleged that defendant had secured access to the styles at private showings
to which defendant had been admitted on condition that he not divulge what
he saw, and through bribing plaintiff's servants. On these facts, Dior is
consistent with judge Hand's opinion in Cheney,9 8 which expressly refused
to follow the rule of the majority in INS. Although Judge Greenberg
seems to treat Dior as an extension of Metropolitan Opera, essentially the
two are quite different. Dior is capable of explanation as involving nothing
more than old-fashioned "dirty business" 99 -business conduct so reprehensible as to constitute independent grounds for an injunction. Facts
which would support such a rationale are absent both in Cheney, which
rejects misappropriation as a ground for relief, and in Metropolitan Opera,
which purports to adopt it.
93 Gotham Music Serv., Inc. v. Denton & Haskins Music Pub. Co., 259 N.Y. 86,
181 N.E. 57 (1932).
94259 N.Y. at 90, 181 N.E. at 58. Plaintiff had contributed more than a new
title. It had, through an extensive publicity campaign, succeeded in popularizing an
obscure song which had theretofore been a commercial failure.

95 Compare the omission in the Waring opinion of any reference to the 1922
dictum of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the gist of unfair competition is

"whether the act done tends to pass off the goods of one for those of another." B.V.D.
Co. v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 272 Pa. 240, 242, 116 Ati. 508, 509 (1922).
96 9

Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nen., 2 App. Div. 878,

156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956).

97 9 Misc. 2d at 430, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
98 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,

281 U.S. 72 (1930).
99 See notes 55-57, 67, 68 supra and accompanying text.
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There has been in fact some doubt as to whether even Metropolitan
Opera could be said to rest solely on a doctrine of misappropriation. Judge
Greenberg weakens his primary holding with the statement, "the complaints
can also be sustained as stating a cause of action for unjustifiable interference with the contractual rights of the plaintiffs." 100 For this reason
the court in Continental Gas. Co. v. Beardsley 101 cites Metropolitan Opera
for the proposition that the New York courts will refuse to find unfair
competition on misappropriation grounds unless other elements are present.
It is clear, however, that the asserted tort against contractual rights in
Metropolitan Opera is nothing like the tortious interference with contractual relations which is the basis of recovery in Dior. The latter is very
plainly dirty business; it involves defendant's having bribed plaintiff's
servants to breach their obligation of trust to their employer. The tort in
Metropolitan Opera has no such independent substance; it is fool's logic to
say that defendant has wronged plaintiff by preventing him from carrying
out a contractual obligation to give exclusive rights in his performance,
when the very issue is the power of plaintiff to prevent defendant from
The tortious interference argument in Metropolitan
appropriating it.
Opera is fatally crippled by circularity; it is really not even a weak alternative holding. Still another alternative ground for relief may have been
deception. Judge Greenberg found it clear that defendant's activities "tend
to mislead the public into believing the recordings are made with the cooperation of Metropolitan Opera and under its supervision," 102 although
he was not content to rest his decision on that ground alone. But such an
argument could, could it not, be made in every case in which defendant
reproduces and sells plaintiff's creation, making a proper attribution of
source, but without plaintiff's consent? Indeed, it seems that the holding
of Metropolitan Opera must be referred to the premise of product misappropriation which is the primary thrust of its opinion.
Mention has already been made of those forces which tend to drive
the courts along this road. Metropolitan Opera and Ettore indicate the
tremendous extent of the changes which the pressures to protect literary
property in uncopyrightables have worked in the law of unfair competition.
C. The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy originated, or perhaps more accurately was first
articulated, in the famous article written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis in 1890 for the Harvard Law Review. 103 Repelled by the increasing amount of unwanted publicity given to matters of personal life,
the authors maintained that the design of the law must be "to protect those
persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern from
100 199 Misc. at 802, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
101 151 F. Supp. 28, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), inodified, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
102 199 Misc. at 792, 101 N.Y.S.2d 489.
103 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rrv. 193 (1890).
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being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all
persons, whatsoever their position or station, from having matters which
they may properly prefer to keep private, made public against their will"; 104
in short, to secure to the individual the "right to be let alone." 105
Is this the interest which Justice Maxey sees as deserving of protection
in Waring? By means of the radio broadcast, two aspects of Waring's
personality are presented to the public-his name and his artistic performance. But neither the publication of the name itself, already extensively publicized, nor the manner of publication-identification as the
performer--can be offensive to an entertainer whose livelihood is dependent
upon fame. Justice Maxey relates the hypothetical story of the President's
daughter who, as an amateur singer, made records for "certain restricted
purposes," contending that she would unquestionably have the right to
restrain unauthorized broadcasting of those records. 108 Admittedly, performing before a limited group consisting of one's personal acquaintances
is not necessarily inconsistent with a desire to withhold that performance
from the public at large. But in appearing personally before and making
records available to a group limited only by sales price or admission charge,
and in broadcasting to the very group reached by the broadcasts which he
seeks to restrain, Waring has demonstrated that he is no longer interested
in keeping his performance secret. Justice Maxey contends that the right
of privacy grants to every individual the right to choose "whether, and
when, and how, and for whose advantage" his performance is to be made
public. 10 7 Professional artists generally, and Waring in particular, have
themselves decided "whether" widespread publications of their performances are to be made; control of "when, how, and for whose advantage"
they are to be made are primarily aids to the artist in capitalizing on the
economic value of his skill.108

Thus Waring can have no "privacy interest," as that term is used
here, and as Brandeis and Warren use it. The interest protected by the
Pennsylvania court in his favor must be economic. And what is true of
Waring will usually be true of the performing artist.10 9 Nevertheless, the
104 Id. at 214. Compare the following definition of a modem writer: "The
right of privacy, in essence, is antisocial. It is the right of an individual to live
a life of seclusion and anonymity, free from the prying curiosity which accompanies
both fame and notoriety . . . .It is a recognition of the dignity of solitude, of the
majesty of man's free will and power to mold his own destiny, of the sacred and
inviolate nature of one's innermost self." Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MIcu.
L. REv. 526, 528 (1941).
205 Warren & Brandeis, spra note 103, at 195.
106 327 Pa. at 457, 194 Atl. at 642.
107 Id. at 461, 194 Att. at 644. (All italicized in original.)
108 Some control over the "how" of publication may, however, be desirable in
order to prevent the type of deprecating use presented on the facts of Martin v.
F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (C.P. 1938). See text accompanying note
121 infra.
109 Ettore's situation presents a slightly different question. The revival of an
interest in privacy suggested by his return to private life presents a tenable contention,
but one which is counterweighted by the interest in the owner of the films which
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point illustrated by the story of the President's daughter-that a limited
performance may be made consistently with a desire to withhold dissemination to the general public-suggests that under some circumstances a
privacy interest may exist in the artistic and literary property with which
this Note is concerned.
To what extent does established doctrine support the use of the right
of privacy to protect that property? Privacy cases cover such a wide
variety of factual situations that it is difficult to select one which might be
called typical. Perhaps illustrative of those in which the doctrine has been
invoked to permit recovery is Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co."i 0 In that case
defendant published in a national women's magazine a photograph of plaintiffs, husband and wife, in an amorous pose. The photograph appeared
in connection with an article entitled "Love" and bore the caption: "Publicized as glamorous, desirable, 'love at first sight' is a bad risk." Plaintiffs
had consented neither to the taking of the photograph nor to its publication.
Reversing a lower court judgment for defendants the Supreme Court of
California stressed that the publication depicted the couple as "persons
whose only interest in each other is sex, a characterization that may be said
to impinge seriously upon their sensibilities." II'
It is clear that the court is protecting plaintiffs against injury to personality. Similar protection has been accorded in cases involving the use
of a person's name,"12 his purported testimonial,"13 oppressive publicity in
collecting bad debts," l 4 eavesdropping,"r 5 publication of private letters," 8
and a variety of other situations." 7 There can be little doubt that what
Brandeis and Warren referred to as the "right to be let alone" has been
widely upheld. Some limits on this right have been defined. Generally,
Ettore has himself created by selling the right to make those films, without restriction
as to the period during which they might be shown. Similarly, in any case in which
some physical creation of a retired artist remains extant, countervailing contractual
or quasi-contractual considerations will probably exist to militate against any theory
of revival-by-retirement. Of course, where the "property" involved is the celebrity's
name or likeness, such consensually created outstanding rights in third parties are
less likely to be found. In some cases, then, the issue of revival of privacy must be
squarely faced. Resolution of the problem in any given case necessitates consideration of the nature of the proposed publication in light of the individual's past position
as a public figure, and perhaps of the lapse of time since his return to private life.
In this regard, compare Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 711 (1940), and Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (4th App.
Dist. 1931), with Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
1io 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
i11 Id. at 279, 239 P.2d at 634.
12 E.g., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).

E.g., Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).
14 E.g., Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
"15 E.g., McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d
810 (1939).
116 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 103, at 211, and cases cited therein.
"17 See cases cited Annot, 138 A.L.R. 22, 98 (1942).
"13
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the courts have imposed those suggested by Brandeis and Warren. 118
Two are important.
The individual's interest in privacy may be outweighed by the public
interest in publication. This countervailing interest is most frequently
found when the affairs of the individual have substantial news value. Thus
in Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner," 9 a woman who committed suicide
by jumping from a public building was held to have lost her right of privacy,
as well as her husband's, with respect to the newspaper publication of her
photograph and the story of the event. The second limitation may be
loosely characterized as a doctrine of waiver which may occur when the
individual himself has published the matter in question, or when consent to
publication has been given either expressly or impliedly. 120 Implied waiver
is particularly important in the field of literary and artistic property, and
has proved to be a major block to performers seeking protection under
privacy doctrines.

For example, in Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 1 2 ' an

actress sought protection against the placing of her photograph outside a
burlesque house. The court held that because of her profession as an entertainer she must be deemed to have surrendered her right of privacy.
Similarly, in ParamountPictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc.,

22

protection

was denied movie actors against the unauthorized sale of posters bearing
their names and photographs. And in Chavez v. Hollywood Am. Legion
Post No. 43,123 a boxer was held to have waived his privacy rights to the
televising of a fight in which he was participating. Generally speaking, this
application of the waiver doctrine seems correct if the privacy doctrine is
meant to protect the privacy interest, although one might argue that even
celebrities should be accorded protection against the type of offensive association involved in the Martin case. "Waiver" of privacy need not be
complete.
Judge Biggs in Ettore cites Norman v. Century Athletic Club 124 as a
"typical" example of a second class of privacy cases-those in which the
performance of a professional has been appropriated. 25 The Norman case
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 103, at 214.
35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (2d App. Dist. 1939).
Frequently, these two limitations overlap, and the result may turn on which
of the two is applied. For an example of the type of factual situation in which
confusion of the two theories may lead to a poor result, see Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre
Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (C.P. 1938).
121 Supra note 120.
12224 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Okla. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.2d 229
(10th Cir. 1939).
12316 U.S. L. WEEIK 2362 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1948).
124 193 Md. 584, 69 A.2d 466 (1949).
125 229 F.2d at 486. It is not altogether clear that Judge Biggs considers this
class of case as within the right-of-privacy category. He speaks of a "right of privacy
or property." Id. at 485. He does, however, begin his lengthy dictum with a reference to the Warren and Brandeis article, continue with a citation to a Prosser article
in which the acceptance of the "right of privacy" throughout the various states is
tabulated, and cite as illustrative of the spectrum a long list of cases which, with the
exception of Nornmn, are all clearly privacy cases. Whether or not Judge Biggs
would attach the "privacy" label to the Norman-type case, it is clear that he views
118
"19
120
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is not in point, but other cases do contain language which suggests that the
right of privacy may be employed to secure to an individual the economic
benefits obtained through the use of his personality. In Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 2 6 the North Carolina court stated:
"If it be conceded that the name of a person is a valuable asset in
connection with an advertising enterprise, then it must likewise be conceded that his face or features are likewise of value. Neither can be
127
used for such a purpose without the consent of the owner .
"...,

But Flake involved a vocalist who was complaining about the use of her
photograph in an advertisement mistakenly identifying her as the leading
lady of the "Folies de Paree," a burlesque-type stage show. 2 8 Also revealing is the fact that the court awarded only nominal damages, an award
which seems inconsistent with protection of an economic interest. On the
other hand, numerous cases can be found in which protection of an economic
interest by means of the right of privacy was denied, usually by application of the waiver doctrine; Chavez is an example. 129 If the New York
cases are excluded, the conclusion that the right of privacy has been used
to protect economic interests is not supported by case holdings.
In New York privacy is protected not by the common law but by
statute. The statute provides that:
"Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state
for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade without the written
consent first obtained . . . may maintain an equitable action in the
supreme court of this state . . . to prevent and restrain the use
thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use .

.

.

. ,0

132
Under it, and under similarly worded statutes in Utah 131 and Virginia,
the elements of a plaintiff's claim are whether a name or likeness is used,

as applicable to the second class a doctrine which if not a right of privacy in the
traditional sense is at least closely akin to it, as distinguished from the other commonlaw doctrines discussed herein. For purposes of this Note we shall refer to Judge
Biggs' treatment of these cases as right-of-privacy theory.
126212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
127 Id. at 793, 195 S.E. at 64. Similar language appears in Munden v. Harris,
153 Mo. App. 652, 660, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (1911), a case involving the use in
advertising of the photograph of a five-year-old child whose name or likeness had
never before been published. But the Munden court also cites with approval language
of "mortifying notoriety" taken from the dissent in Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 563, 64 N.E. 442, 450 (1902). The Roberson decision is
widely known as the first to consider, and to reject, the common-law right of privacy.
Reaction against the decision led to the enactment of the New York privacy statute,
quoted in text accompanying note 130 infra.
128 Compare the denial of this protection in the Martin case. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
129 See text accompanying note 123 supra.
10 N.Y. CIV RIGHTS LAW § 51.
131 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-9 (1953).
32
1 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1950).
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and whether the use is for purposes of advertising or trade. 133 The statutory language is wide enough to allow the courts to grant protection of
an economic interest,134 and the waiver doctrine which in common-law
jurisdictions normally operates to bar protection is not written into the
legislation. This approach which, perhaps fortuitously, precludes inquiry
into several dimensions fundamental to the more orthodox concept of the
right, serves to explain cases such as Redmond v. Columbia Pictures
Corp.

35

and Sharkey v. NBC. 13 6

In Redmond, plaintiff, a professional

golfer who specialized in demonstrating trick shots, had given a performance to be photographed for use in a newsreel. A later unauthorized use
of this filmed performance as part of a short subject was held to create a
cause of action under the New York statute. And the Sharkey court sustained, as against a motion to dismiss, a complaint alleging facts virtually
identical to those of Ettore. 37 Since in neither case does the result seem
justifiable as protection of a privacy interest, the "privacy statute" does
appear to operate in some instances at least to secure to performers the
economic benefits of their skills. 138 Its value in this regard, however,
is limited by the holding in Gautier v. Pro-Football,Inc.,13 9 in which an
animal trainer performed between the halves of a professional football
game. In spite of an express provision in his contract that the performance
was not to be televised without his consent, the court held that the commercially sponsored televising did not create a cause of action under the
New York statute, since plaintiff's performance was not made a part of the
TV commercials themselves. Judge Biggs, applying New York law in
Ettore, recognized this limitation as precluding recovery under the
140
statute.
Indeed, however extensive is the discussion of the right of privacy
in his Ettore opinion, recovery there was predicated on that right only with
133 For a helpful judicial exposition of the scope of the New York statute, see
Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d 636 (1938).
134 On the other hand, in an action for damages a court might interpret the
statute, in light of its legislative history (see note 127 supra), as permitting monetary

recovery only for injuries to personality.

The New York courts do not appear to

have adopted this view, although the results of decided cases are somewhat incon-

clusive. See notes 135-39 infra and accompanying text. In any event, the availability
of injunctive relief would seem to afford considerable economic protection for the
professional performer. Scrutiny of plaintiff's motives for suit is a task which courts
are not likely to take on quickly.
135277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d 636 (1938).
136 93 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
137 The only basis for distinction would seem to lie in the fact that Sharkey was
still a public figure. This would make relief on privacy grounds less appropriate
than in Ettore.
13 See also Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937) (use
of stage name "Aunt Jemima"); Young v. Greneker Studios, 175 Misc. 1027, 26
N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (unauthorized sale of manikins for which plaintiff
had posed); Lane v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, 11 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct),
aff'd without opinion, 256 App. Div. 1065, 12 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1939) (use of actress'
picture in lockets sold by defendant).
139 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
140 229 F.2d at 493.
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respect to New Jersey, as to which the 1907 case of Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co.141 was relied on. This latter case involved a medicinal
preparation made and sold by defendants, the containers bearing a picture
of the famous inventor and his purported statement that the product had
been prepared according to his formula. The right of privacy was expressly made the basis for decision, and there is some language in the opinion indicating that the court recognized the economic value of plaintiff's
name.1 42 While Edison's position as a public figure might be viewed as
inconsistent with the retention of a privacy interest as to some aspects of
his personality,143 a decision restraining the unauthorized use of an indorsement need not necessarily rest on the individual's right to benefit economically from his name. A forged testimonial may injure the sensibilities of
the individual just as would publicizing the details of his personal life.
Concededly, the current widespread use of testimonials in commercial advertising makes recognition of this interest economically advantageous to
the public figure, who may in fact care little about the product to which
his name is attached so long as he is paid for the attachment. 144 Nevertheless, the difficulties of separating the economic interest from the interest
in maintaining integrity of personality does not compel economic protection
in situations where, as in Waring and Ettore, these difficulties are not
45
present.'
D. Equitable Servitude

One of the consequences of the logic of the Hohfeldian notion of
property, which treats ownership as an aggregate of separate rights, is the
proposition that an owner may sell less than all the rights which he has
in a particular thing. Theoretically at least he may dispose of the right of
exclusive possession (the right to exclude others) while retaining rights
against the possessor to limit the latter in his use of the thing. The restriction on the possessor's freedom to use the thing is not merely a matter of
his personal obligation as vendee, although it may also be that; fundamentally it inheres in the thing sold and moves with it in the hands of
subsequent purchasers. It is not quite correct to say that the thing sold
bears a restriction. More accurately one should say that the set of rights
purchased in a thing are incomplete, certain of them having been withheld
14173

NJ. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (Ch. 1907).

142 Id. at 141, 67 AtI. at 394.
143 See text accompanying note

106 and cases cited notes 119-23 supra. See also
note 109 supra.
144 Recognition of an independent right in an entertainer to share in the economic
benefits flowing from the use of his name, picture, or testimonial in advertising is
advocated by Nimmer in The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTSmP. PRoB. 203
(1954).
14 5 For extensive criticism of Justice Maxey's opinion in Waring see Countryman,
The Organized Musicians, 16 U. CHL L. REv. 239, 255 (1949); Warner, Legal
Protection of the Content of Radio and Television Programs, 36 IowA L. REv. 14,
21 (1950). See also the opinion of Judge Hand in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
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by the original vendor, and that this absence of right persists until those
which are missing are secured from the one who originally withheld them.
The practical limitations of this theoretical structure are obvious. The
subsequent purchaser who takes possession without notice that certain
rights have been withheld has a strong equity for which the logic of the
scheme makes no allowance. And even where a subsequent purchaser has
notice of the state of his vendor's title, policy may require that the law limit
the logical reach of this notion of ownership.
Historically these doctrines seem to have been worked out first in the
law of real property. 146 One of the earliest cases to adapt them for use in
147
other fields is said to be Werderinan v. Societe General d'Electricite.
Plaintiff granted a patent to X, the latter agreeing that he and his assigns
would pay plaintiff a fixed percentage of the return. X then formed a
corporation to which he assigned the patent. Plaintiff brought suit for
an accounting against the corporation, alleging that defendant had taken
the patent with notice. On demurrer, the court ruled for plaintiff, Sir
George Jessel arguing from the fact that:
"the parties intended certain liabilities to attach to the patent itself .

.

.

. It is quite plain that nobody could take the patent with

notice of that arrangement, and say we will keep the profits and will
not be liable to account .

.

.

. It is a part of the bargain that the

patent shall be worked in a particular way and the profits disposed of
in a particular way, and no one taking with notice of that bargain can
avoid the liability." 148
In view of the origins of the doctrine, Jessel's recognition of a servitude in
an intangible seems rather remarkable; certainly the concept as applied to
chattels demands less sophistication. Two cases decided in this country
at the end of the 19th century indicate that it was by this latter route that
the doctrine made its way into the law of literary property: both dealt with
restrictions upon the use of plates containing type or pictures for printing.
Meyer v. Estes, 49 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in 1895, involved the sale by plaintiff to defendant of electrotypes for an
apparently uncopyrighted book, the latter covenanting not to sell to another. When the restriction was breached, the plates having come into the
hands of a sub-purchaser without notice, plaintiff proceeded on the contract against the original buyer and recovered damages. And in 1899, in
Murphy v. Christian Press Ass'n,150 a New York court enforced a restriction on the use of plates against a party not in privity with the plaintiff.
146

See Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REv. 945 (1928).

Ch. D. 246 (1881).
148 Id. at 251-52.
147

19

164 Mass. 457, 41 N.E. 683 (1895).
150 38 App. Div. 426, 56 N.Y. Supp. 597 (1899).
'49
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Plaintiff had purchased the plates from X, both parties agreeing to a
schedule of minimum prices for the book. X went into receivership and
the plates were sold to defendant who, with notice of the terms of the
agreement, used them to publish a book which he then offered for sale
below the stipulated minima.
Although the plaintiff in Murphy was not the copyright proprietor,
the fact that the work involved had been copyrighted weighed heavily in
the result. The opinion suggests that the hostility of the common law to
monopoly stops short of the area protected by the copyright laws, perhaps
on the theory that where the law permits an author to prevent unrestricted
copying of his work, he may set conditions or authorize others to set conditions on its use. Professor Chafee has suggested this as one of the reasons
why a stronger case might be made for the enforcement of conditions on the
use of copyrighted property than of material not protected by the statute. 5 1
The availability of copyright protection, however, seems generally to have
proved more of a hindrance than a help in attaching servitudes to literary
property. Not only does the statute confer no such special benefits upon
those who copyright under it,152 but proof that plaintiff omitted to secure
copyright protection he could have secured has itself been a ground for
denying relief.153
However more congenial theoretically to the area encompassed by the
copyright statutes, the servitude doctrines seemed to offer answer to a need
most keenly felt by the creators of uncopyrightable works. In some cases,
by the very act which put their common-law copyright in jeopardy it was
possible to give notice of the existence of a servitude, so that as one source
of protection was abandoned an alternative could be invoked. It was in this
situation that the promise latent in the concept of the servitude found its
fruition in Waring. If by making and selling phonograph records, Waring
was publishing his work in such a way as to terminate the common-law
copyright, by marking the labels with the legend "Not Licensed for Radio
Broadcast" he was giving notice to all subsequent purchasers of the inter151 Chafee, supra note 146, at 998. Chafee urges, further, that from an analytical
point of view the copyright could be made to serve as a "dominant tenement!' to the
restraint. Moreover, copyright would offer the advantage that plaintiff need not
rest his case on contract or equitable grounds, since if the power to impose restrictions
is viewed as incident to the copyright, violation would become a form of infringement.
This last contention was rejected by the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), where the copyright proprietor sought to enforce a
minimum price restriction against a sub-purchaser with notice. The court, treating
the action as resting solely on the statute, found in it no basis for the right asserted.
52
3
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, supra note 151.
'53 Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1914) (export
restriction on uncopyrighted movie unenforceable against sub-purchaser without
notice). The failure of the servitude doctrines to take root in the supposedly favorable
soil of copyright law was indicative of a general coolness. Writing in 1928 in the
Harvard Law Review, Chafee was forced to admit that "servitudes on chattels still
seem possible and reasonable, although my long investigation has not disclosed a
single square decision establishing such a conception in a court of last resort." Chafee,
supra note 146, at 1013.
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est which he had reserved. 5 4 Surveying the state of the law of equitable
servitudes in chattels, Justice Stern finds that the cases refusing to uphold
them fall into two classes. The first consists roughly of servitudes which
operate in restraint of trade. 55 The second comprises cases involving
attempts to fix servitudes on works which "could have been protected by
copyright of the work under the statute, and therefore there was no real need
for equitable relief." 150 Concluding, Justice Stern finds nothing in the cases
collected to deny the propriety of using the servitude doctrine to protect a
copyright interest in uncopyrightables.
Because of its inherent limitations, however, the usefulness of the
doctrine as a copyright surrogate may be limited. Waring is in many
ways an ideal case under this theory: the restriction is explicit in the agreement between the artist and the disseminator, the chattel bears the notice
on its face, and it passes by a chain of contractual relationships to the ultimate user. As any one or more of these factors are withdrawn, it
becomes more difficult to make a rational application of the servitude theory.
In INS, it will be remembered, defendant obtained plaintiff's news by buying East Coast newspapers and by reading reports posted with plaintiff's
consent on public bulletin boards. In buying the newspapers, defendant
may be said to have entered into contractual relations with plaintiff. From
a purely theoretical standpoint it could be argued that plaintiff has sold only
some rights in his news, not all-and that the subject of the sale was not the
news itself, but solely the right to read it and communicate it to others
informally. Part of the bargain would be the reservation by seller of all
rights to publish the news in a newspaper so long as it had commercial
value. Most of the support for this argument drops out if the sale of the
newspaper is stricken from the facts. The notion of the creation of a
servitude, while not logically repugnant to the gratuitous distribution of a
thing, is not really compatible with it. In the one, parties bargain 157 for
rights in a chattel; in the other, where a chattel is abandoned or gratuitously
delivered to another, the recipient may quite reasonably fail to suppose
that the donor has retained rights in it. The contractual chain by which,
in Waring, the theory would suppose that each vendee passed to his
subvendee only as much as he himself had gotten, here is severed at the
first link.
The second factor relates to the manner in which the right is reserved.
Although the argument was made in Waring that no written contract
154 This legend serves a dual role in Justice Stem's opinion in Waring. To the
extent that intent is made a part of the test of publication, it is treated as evidence
of Waring's intent not to give up his common-law literary property in the work.
327 Pa. at 443, 194 Atl. at 636. But it is also the basis of the court's conclusion that
Waring had imposed an effective servitude on the discs.
155 The cases in this class generally involve the fixing of retail prices by manufacturers, or by agreements which operate to tie the use of a scarce good to another
good, less in demand, also marketed by the seller.
156

327 Pa. at 445, 194 At. at 637.

157 See text accompanying note 148

supra.
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existed between the artist and the recording studio expressly limiting the
use to which the records might be put, the court with little difficulty found
ample evidence of an understanding to that effect. The facts of Ettore are
very different. What evidence there was indicated that the performer had
had no intent to reserve any rights in the films of his boxing exhibition.
To repair this defect Judge Biggs resorted to the "new use" theory of
contract construction-indulging the assumption that the parties intended
by a grant of rights to permit the work to be used only in ways which at
the time of contracting might appear likely. 158 Under this theory, rights to
all new uses not expressly provided for remain in the performer.
Judge Hastie, in dissent, admonished the court that by applying this
doctrine on these facts, it was creating by implication an equitable servitude
as a rule of law.159 It is one thing for a court to find implied terms in a
contract when only the rights of the contracting parties are involved, but
quite another when the interests at stake are those of some ultimate purchaser. This second dimension seems wholly absent from the consideration of the majority. Part of the blame may lie with the defendant, since
the opinion contains evidence that the contract and the servitude arguments
were originally confused by the defense. The thread of the first argument
is that by failing to make express reservation of television rights in the
contract, Ettore must be presumed to have given up any claim he had to
such use. The second argument, disentangled, is that regardless of the
meaning given to the contract, no effective servitude could be imposed to
run with the films and restrict the use to which they might be put by some
third party.
Ettore is further complicated by the absence of any express notice of
restriction to the user. This third factor is bound up with the second, in
that usually where the original contractual restriction must be inferred
the warning to the sub-purchaser will also be constructive. The problems
are still separable, however. In INS, the contract between plaintiff and
its member newspapers was express and detailed as to the manner in which
the news might be used, 60 yet the news, when embodied in the newspapers
and sold to the public, carried no express notice of restriction. Certainly,
the circumstances of the appropriation gave warning to defendant in INS.
But it is hard to see how defendant in Ettore could have anticipated the
performer's claim.
What these analyses demonstrate is not that the equitable servitude
theory cannot be used to protect a literary property interest, but that as
a device to that end it has intrinsic limitations. The more central question
is really raised by Waring, which fits the doctrine to perfection. Judge
'sSBut cf. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, 213 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 858 (1954) ; Autry v. Republic Prods. Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.

1954).

'59 229 F.2d at 496. Such an innovation Judge Hastie regarded as impermissible
for a federal court applying state law in exercise of the diversity jurisdiction.
160 248 U.S. at 230.
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Hand's assertion in Whiteman that "the records could not be clogged with
a servitude" 161 brings both sides clearly to issue: "Restrictions upon the
use of chattels once absolutely sold are at least prima facie invalid; they
must be justified for some exceptional reason, normally they are 'repugnant'
to the transfer of title." 162 Ultimately the resolution must depend upon
a judgment as to the propriety of state common-law recognition of a
creator's interest in matter to which Congress has not extended statutory
copyright protection.
III.

THE ROLE OF THE STATES

What emerges from this survey of the development and application
of common-law doctrines at the peripheries of the Copyright Act is that
state courts, and federal courts in diversity cases, are granting protection
against activities which have the smack of "free rides" at the expense of
creators of artistic and literary works. Ostensibly, they are applying traditional common-law doctrines to factual situations which at first glance seem
closely related to those for which the doctrines were developed. But in
such cases as Waring and Ettore, these doctrines have been turned into
devices for protecting a copyright interest-the interest of the creator in
securing financial reward through the commercial exploitation of his
creation.
Both the constitutional propriety and the institutional wisdom of this
action bear inquiry. Certainly the primary question must be whether our
federal system imposes limits on the power of the states to afford such
relief. Ultimate boundaries, however, are not necessarily optimal ones, and
cogent reasons may sometimes appear for the states to decline to exercise
their constitutional competence in the interests of a more workable allocation of responsibility between states and Nation. From this standpoint
it is not essential to describe in detail the ultimate reaches of state power,
but only to sketch their dimension, as a preliminary to the martialling of
argument addressed to the discretion of the states.
It is axiomatic in the American federal scheme that residual sovereignty lies in the states, that federal law prescribes only when justifiable
within the terms of the Constitution, and that it pre-empts only where the
continued existence of state law may be incompatible with the achievement
of an appropriate federal objective.
Such pre-emption may arise in two ways: as a direct negative command of the Constitution (express or implied), or by explicit direction or
implication in the exercise by Congress of the power conveyed to it in the
constitutional grant. Judge Hand's restrictive view of state competence
in the sphere of literary property seems to invoke that type of pre-emption
which is worked immediately, though impliedly, by the Constitution itself.
161114 F.2d at 88.
162

Id. at 89.
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Its exposition goes back at least as far as 1929, when in the opinion of the
court in Cheney 163 he said:
"To exclude others from the enjoyment of a chattel is one thing; to
prevent any imitation of it, to set up a monopoly in the plan of its
structure, gives the author a power over his fellows vastly greater, a
power which the Constitution allows only Congress to create." 164
But it was Metropolitan Opera, which by operation of the Erie rule compelled surrender of all less-than-constitutional objections to enforcement of
performers' rights in commercially disseminated records in New York, that
tore apart Judge Hand's majority and forced him to retreat definitively
behind the barrier of federal pre-emption in Capitol Records. Judge Hand
insisted that "the failure of Congress to include within the [Copyright] Act
all that the Clause covers" could not have the effect of leaving to the states
the power to create perpetual monopolies. "To do so would pro tanto
defeat the overriding purpose of the Clause, which was to grant only for
'limited Times' the untrammelled exploitation of an author's 'writings'." 165
The Constitutional provision must at least have the effect of limiting the
power of the states to deny the divestitive effect of publication in uncopyrightables:
"I would hold that the clause has that much effect ex proprio vigore;
and that the states are not free to follow their own notions as to when
an author's right shall be unlimited both in user and duration. Such
power of course they have as to 'works' that are not 'Writings'; but
I submit that, once it is settled that a 'work' is in that class, the Clause
enforces upon the author the choice [between circumscribed exploitation and dedication]

. . . ; and, if so, it must follow that it is a

federal question whether he has published the 'work'."

166

Yet despite the power of Judge Hand's reasoning, it is hard to see
how the Clause unassisted could work a deprivation of power in the states.
It is in terms no more than an affirmative grant of substantive power to
Congress. Such a grant normally has the effect of making the area one
of concurrent power, not of exclusive federal power. 167 State law is excluded only when Congress acts, and only insofar as it may be inconsistent
with the congressional purpose. The evolution of the commerce clause is
evidence of the wide acceptance of this principle, which was seen most
recently, for example, as the persistent theme of inquiry in the Supreme
Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
164 Id. at 280.
165 221 F.2d at 667 (dissent).
166 Ibid.
167 THE FEDERALIST, No. 32 (Hamilton); Kalodner & Vance, The Relation
Between Federal and State Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HMv.
163 Cheney Bros. v. Doris

L. REv. 1079, 1082 (1959).
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Court's efforts to define the limits of state power in the labor-management
relations field. 1 8
The consequence of this logic is to alter the direction of the search
for pre-emption. The bounds of state competence are thus defined at the
points where the common-law protection of literary property in uncopyrightables impinges upon the federal statutory scheme. In their pioneering
article in the Harvard Law Review, 169 Kalodner and Vance, by application
of this concept, determine and describe in detail the effective limits of state
power. Generally speaking, the limitation is made to depend upon the possible dilution of a federal policy with regard to some copyrightable element
in the work.
But whatever judgment be made as to absolute, federally enforceable
limits, the question of a restraint self-imposed by the states remains. The
appropriate inquiry in this context is not whether the Constitution forbids
authority to the states, but rather whether the states can exercise that
authority consistently with the demands of a rational overall scheme of
protection for literary property. The pressures for state common-law
vindication of a copyright interest in matter constitutionally capable of
copyright but not within the federal statute have been alluded to throughout the length of this Note, and it is hardly necessary to summarize them
here. It remains but to spell out those factors which should give courts
pause before affording any relief of this kind.
(1) The mass media of the twentieth century, virtually all of which
operate across state lines, require a uniform law of literary property, lest
they be subjected to a welter of different and confusing state rules. The
desire to secure uniformity was doubtless a principal motive behind the
inclusion of the copyright clause in the Constitution. 170 One of the valuable
byproducts of Swift v. Tyson 17' was the opportunity which it gave to the
federal courts to develop a uniform substantive law of literary property.
Writing in 1940, Professor Chafee ruefully predicted that the effect of
Erie would be to tear to pieces this federal jurisprudence 72 Capitol
Records is his prophecy come true.
Ettore graphically demonstrates the range of problems which the
absence of a uniform rule creates. There, Judge Biggs was called upon
to determine the legal consequences of a single television broadcast under
168 Compare Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), with International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), and UAW v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634 (1958). Congress' own recent attempt to close the book on these problems
is the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 701(a), 73 Stat.
541 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2983-84 (Sept. 14, 1959)), 108 U. PA. L. Ray.
587 (1960).
169 Kalodner & Vance, supra note 167.
170 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Hand in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury
Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955), and authorities cited therein.
7141 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
172 Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HAv. L. REv. 1289, 1299 (1950).
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the laws of each of the four states in which it was viewed, and with little
guidance as to the correct result in any of the four.173 One wonders what
judge would have been capable of dealing with the case on these terms had
the telecast been nationwide. Of even greater importance is the problem
faced by the publisher. Must NBC, or the producer of the fight films,
predict the protection which might be accorded in each of the states for
which publication is planned? The inevitable confusion resulting from
conflicting rules would seem to make both planning and bargaining with
the performer on any rational basis virtually impossible.
(2) If defendants are to be protected from surprise liability, the scope
of plaintiff's right must be given a reasonably accurate definition. Fairness
demands that liability be imposed only where the wrongdoer could reasonably be expected to appreciate that his conduct might put legally protected interests of others in jeopardy. Proper placement of notice is essential to the validity of statutory copyright. 74 Its importance lies in the
warning it conveys of a claim to the protection of the Copyright Act over
all that appears in connection with it.17 5 So important is this notice that
where it appears in an unlimited form on a book containing in its typography
an uncopyrightable element, state law will not be permitted to protect an
interest in the typography once the copyright notice indicates that the federal statutory interest in the work has been dedicated. This is the holding
of Ricordi,'76 and Judge Hand explains it with the statement that the notice
"would imply that, when the copyright expired, the 'work' in all its aspects
would be in the public desmesne." 177 By extension it might be argued that
the absence of a notice on a work of a type normally copyrighted might
likewise imply that the work is unprotected. In other words, if the public
is to be encouraged in its reliance on the copyright notice as indicating the
status of a work, perhaps all works which constitute "Writings" in the
constitutional sense should be held free of any literary creator's interest
unless copyrighted and accompanied by the statutory notice.
Naturally certain qualifications would be necessary to a principle which
denied literary protection other than that prescribed by the federal act.
The courts have recognized that when a copyright expires on a name it
"goes out to the public subject to a certain and well understood limitation
or condition, namely, that the public right to use shall be so exercised as
not to deceive members of the public and lead them into the belief that
they are buying the particular or identical thing which was produced under
173
In one sense, Judge Biggs may have been relatively fortunate. In Pennsylvania and New York, more guidance was available from the state courts than is
typically the case. Consider, for example, the paucity of authority available from
the courts of the two remaining states, New Jersey and Delaware. See text accompanying notes 17-21, 141 supra.
174
Booth v. Haggard, 184 F2d 470 (8th Cir. 1950).
175 G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir. 1952).
176 Ibid.
17 Id. at 915.
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the copyright." 178 Also, a copyright notice ought not have the effect of
cutting off a claim based on injury to privacy, just as it cannot be raised
as a defense to a defamation action. Perhaps where the action is grounded
on injury to privacy, a court should make a determination as to whether
the nature of the material was such that defendant might reasonably sup179
pose permission of the copyright proprietor to be insufficient.
(3) Only large-scale legislative investigation can properly consider all
the interests at stake in any regulation of literary and artistic property
rights. Literary property is today an extremely significant element in the
nation's economic life; it is, in fact, very big business. Typically, it is the
function of the legislative branch to investigate large social problems involving numerous conflicting interests, and to determine their solutions.
The legislative committee hearing is designed to collect the information
from all sides; and the legislature is directly responsible to the mass of
the voters. There is reason behind the traditional judicial deference, in
such matters, to the politically responsive organs of government-grounded
perhaps on an underlying belief that the legislature is more likely to be
right, perhaps on a conviction that, whether it is right or wrong, the people
are more likely to accept the decisions of their own representatives. Part
of that reason is that a court in the context of an adversary hearing cannot
possibly get all the interested parties before it.
This last aspect is of prime importance. In virtually every case in
which the common-law doctrines have been utilized as the basis for
judicial protection of literary and artistic property, the ostensible controversy has been between the uncompensated creator and the nonpaying
entrepreneur. Yet present, but unrepresented, in each case is the public,
whose interest is frequently most closely allied with the apparent "misappropriator." Again, the backstage scene is ofttimes cluttered by a host
of additional parties: consider, for example, the number of people who
might legitimately have claimed a share of the proceeds received from the
televising of the fight films in Ettore. Judge Hand's statement in Cheney is
most apt: "[I]t is not for us to decide. Our vision is inevitably contracted,
and the whole horizon may contain much which will compose a very different picture." 180
178 Merriam v. Ogilvie, 159 Fed. 638, 640 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 209 U.S.
551 (1908).
179 See Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
18035 F.2d at 281. See the opinion of Judge Hand in RCA Mfg. Co. v.
Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940) : "We are adjured that courts must adjust
themselves to new conditions, and that in the case at bar justice clearly points the
way to some relief. We cannot agree; no doubt we should be jealous to execute all
reasonable implications of established doctrines; but we should be equally jealous
not to undertake the composition of substantial conflicts of interests, between which
neither the common law, nor the statute, has given any clue to its preference. We
cannot know how Congress would solve this issue; we can guess-and our guess is
that it would refuse relief as we are refusing it-but if our guess were the opposite,
we should have no right to enforce it." Cf. the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis
in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 264-67 (1918).
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(4) Both the Constitution and the common law are opposed to perpetual monopoly. By express provision in the copyright clause, the framers
extended to Congress the power to create monopolies of certain kinds and
denied it the power to make its grants perpetual. In retrospect, this seems
a very politic compromise between two contending principles. The common law has little love for economic privilege.'18 Yet in a free enterprise
system, creativity demands pecuniary incentives, and these are most easily
afforded by devices which reward the creator by insulating him from competition. The Constitution empowers Congress to apportion the use of the
work between the creator and the community, by setting a time limit to the
former's exclusive use. Because the economic well-being of the consumer is
the paramount end, the creator's share, in theory at least, ought to be no
larger than is necessary to provide what in the legislature's judgment constitutes adequate incentive.
This balance which the statute achieves is lost where the vindication
of a copyright interest is grounded on common-law causes of action. No
limitation runs to terminate the creator's right in the interest of the consumer. The effect of permitting the states to afford this kind of protection
is to cheat the public domain of its expectancy.

It is important to contain the persuasive thrust of this enumeration to
its appropriate context, and to consider once again that range of interests
which may legitimately seek protection under state law. Often the copyright interest is bound up with interests of this latter kind; this Note has,
in fact, been at pains to demonstrate how, in many cases, relief purporting
to rest on the first ground is actually attributable to the latter. The assumption that it is appropriate for the states to grant redress for injury to
personality and for fraud and deception in the conduct of business matters
has been fundamental throughout the inquiry and remains unquestioned
here. Mere copyrightability, the constitutional possibility of congressional
protection, should in itself work no deprivation of the states' capacity to
vindicate injuries to interest which have traditionally looked to them for
protection.
Yet it is indisputably true that some courts have demonstrated a willingness to move beyond the familiar areas of state protection to protect
what can only be a pure literary property interest. Ettore is certainly an
instance of this tendency, and Waring and Metropolitan Opera share in it
as well. Each of these bears the marks of an arduous and painful effort
to justify in familiar terms a form of relief wholly unfamiliar and unique.
Much has been said already of the efforts made to expand the law of common-law copyright, unfair competition, and the right of privacy. But
181 See the concurring opinion of Judge Frank in Standard Brands, Inc. v.
Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1945).
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perhaps it is worthwhile reflecting here on the resiliency of old bottles such
as these. Exercises in legal fiction-making, such as Justice Maxey's adaptation of the privacy doctrines to Waring's needs, and Judge Biggs' application of unfair competition theories to Ettore's situation, carry with them the
seeds of a perilous confusion. There is, in fact, a very real danger that
the old bottles may break.
True, the common law does not grow by discrete and clearly discernible stages; its genius lies in its ability to borrow and adapt from the
past. But the vice of this remarkable capacity for gradual evolution lies
in the danger that profound changes may be worked unattended by the
rational debate and exploration which should precede them. Courts have
thus dispensed a novel kind of relief without facing or dealing with a host
of basic questions. Is the protection granted essential to the stimulation
of creativity? Should the law undertake to foster the creation of works
of this kind? What effects will such protection have on the structure of
the industries immediately concerned? From inquiries such as these there
emerges the ultimate question: whether, if a rational scheme for the protection of literary property is to be achieved, the courts of the several states
are to be the agency of its realization.
W. J. G.
H. K. S.

